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CHAPTER 8 
The Potential of Structured Finance to Foster 
Agricultural Lending in Developing Countries 
Peter Hartig1, Michael Jainzik2, and Klaus Pfeiffer3 
1 Introduction 
Three out of every four poor people in developing countries live in rural areas; 2.1 
billion of them live on less than two U.S. dollars a day and 880 million on less 
than one dollar a day. Most of these people depend on agriculture for their liveli-
hoods.4 One of the major bottlenecks of agricultural development and rural growth 
is the lack of access to finance, a result of perceived high risks and costs involved 
in agricultural lending, among other financial services. Banks and other financial 
institutions in developing countries are still very reluctant to finance agricultural 
producers and, in particular, small farmers. 
As a consequence, for example in various African countries, less than one per-
cent of the available domestic private sector financing typically goes to agricul-
ture, while agriculture accounts for up to 70 percent of the labor force in these 
countries.5 
The aim of this chapter is to explore whether structured finance (SF) has the 
potential to overcome some of the impediments of agricultural lending in develop-
ing countries by mitigating specific risks associated with lending to agriculture. 
Such risk mitigation is possible by sharing, pooling, transferring, and diversifying 
the various risks. 
We start with a broad definition of the term SF, and definitions of agricultural 
lending and agricultural value chain finance. Then we present typical agricultural 
risks and risk management strategies including the potential role of SF. After-
wards, we analyse various SF products that foster agricultural lending. The chap-
ter closes with the limitations and important pre-conditions of SF in agriculture in 
developing countries. 
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2 Concept of Structured Finance 
SF is not a concise term nor is there a universal definition. Depending on where it 
is applied, the term covers a wide range of financial market activities and instru-
ments. Typically, SF is understood as a flexible financial engineering tool that can 
be “employed whenever the requirements of the originator or the owner of an as-
set, be they concerned with funding liquidity, risk transfer, or other need, cannot 
be met by an existing off-the-shelf product or instrument. Hence to meet these re-
quirements, existing products and techniques must be engineered into a tailor-
made product or process.”6 
Discussion and practice in development finance, for example in the context of 
providing refinancing to microfinance institutions (MFIs), is primarily focused on 
securitization and structured funds. Both apply the principle of pooling, diversify-
ing, and tranching assets into different asset classes according to their respective 
(presumed) risk profile.7 
In agricultural finance literature, SF is customarily defined broadly: “Structured 
finance for agriculture and agribusiness is the advance of funds to enterprises to 
finance inputs, production and the accompanying support operations, using certain 
types of security that are not normally accepted by banks or investors and which 
are more dependent on the structure and performance of the transaction, rather 
than the characteristics (e.g. creditworthiness) of the borrower.”8 Thus, in agricul-
tural finance literature, there is a focus on securities (i.e. collateral) in order to re-
duce credit risk, rather than on other aspects like risk transfer, liquidity, etc. 
As far as the authors’ understanding of SF is concerned, the application of SF 
in whatever form follows one major goal: the financial risk of an investment in a 
pool of diversified assets (e.g. loans), or the set of different unseparated risks 
connected with such an investment are decomposed into different types of risks 
or classes of risk (probability of occurrence). This is done by using special tech-
nical and legal tools in order to allow different investors (or risk carriers) to in-
vest precisely in a certain type of risk, which they are best prepared or willing to 
invest in. 
Following this definition, the different forms of SF can be analysed by asking 
three questions (see Figure 2 below). We will use these questions later as a grid 
for filtering out suitable SF approaches for agriculture finance. 
                                                          
6 Fabozzi et al. (2006), p. 1. See also Fender and Mitchell (2005, pp. 69-71) and Fabozzi 
(2005). 
7 For the motives and advantages of securitization as instrument for MFI refinance see 
for example Glaubitt, et al. (2008), p. 354, or Basu (2005). Risks involved in the se-
curitization process are analyzed in Fender and Mitchell (2005). See also below in 
this article. 
8 Winn et al. (2009), p. 2. 
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Structuring Process Outcome 
Segmented types of risk Segmentation of various 
investment risks 
Defined levels and classes of risk 
Allocation and placement 
of risks 
Investment in a specific risk or risk tranche by the most 
appropriate party based on its 
x Understanding and assessing of the risks 
x Capacity to influence probability of occurrence of 
certain types of risk 
x Risk carrying capacity 
Fig. 1. The Essence of Structured Finance 
Fig. 2. Analytical Grid of Structured Finance 
Since agricultural lending is carrying sector-specific risk and is perceived to carry 
higher risks than lending to other sectors, the risk segmenting and transferring ap-
proach of SF makes it, in principle, appropriate and promising for agricultural 
lending. 
                                                          
9 The question of the right incentives cannot be underestimated. As Ananth and Sahas-
ranaman (2011) argue: “Good financial structuring isolates the various risks involved in 
a project and allocates them to the parties best equipped to handle them. All the fallout 
from the recent credit crisis has shown, it is critical that any robust financial structure 
ensures that all parties in a transaction are incentivized appropriately. In a situation 
where all risks in a transaction are passed on to end investors, asset originators and fi-
nancial intermediaries have little incentive to perform the requisite due diligence at the 
time of originating and buying asset portfolios.” 
Core questions for analysing Structured Finance approaches 
i. Information asymmetries: Which party or investor is most suited for understand-
ing and assessing a certain type of risk? 
ii. Incentives: Which party or investor is most suitable for influencing the probability 
of occurrence of a certain risk or the severity of the event?9 
iii. Risk carrying capability: Which party or investor has the financial or organiza-
tional means to efficiently and effectively carry a certain risk?  
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3 Risk-Based Differentiation Between Agricultural and Rural 
Finance 
Agricultural finance refers to financial services used throughout the agricultural 
sector for farming and farm-related activities including input supply, processing, 
wholesale trade, and marketing. Whereas agricultural finance refers to all kinds of 
services (including deposit services, money transfers, etc.) for such businesses, 
discussion in development finance traditionally focuses on agricultural credit, pre-
dominantly on credit for primary agricultural production.10 
Since SF typically targets at credit risks, this article is focusing on agricultural 
credit, too.11 But we include the above mentioned agro-related value chain activi-
ties under the headline of agricultural credit. Both farming activities and non-farm 
activities in the agricultural value chain have two relevant features in common and 
which are reflected in SF and risk-management approaches: 
x Both farming and related economic activities in the value chain12 are often 
characterised by seasonalities, and 
x They are often exposed to the same specific agricultural risks.13 
In contrast, the concept of rural finance is not defined referring to a business sec-
tor, but instead to a geographical definition. It refers to financial services in rural 
areas that result in a somehow broader category than agricultural finance as it in-
cludes financial services to rural businesses that are not directly linked to farming 
including production and service activities like restaurants, retail shops or manu-
facturers, as well as financial services to rural households. These customers are 
not necessarily directly or only indirectly linked to seasonalities and specific risks 
of agriculture. On the other hand, rural finance does not include urban-based proc-
essing facilities or other agri-businesses which are subject to agricultural risk. 
Thus, from a risk-perspective, the concept of rural finance is fuzzy. However, 
serving both non-farm and farm clients in rural areas is a way for financial institu-
tions to diversify credit risks and increase scale.14 
                                                          
10 See for instance Meyer (2013), about the historical development of agricultural finance 
(”the old paradigm“). 
11 Agricultural credit to farmers is normally provided in cash. But in some structures (in-
volving non-financial intermediaries – see below in the article) in-kind loans are pro-
vided for seed, fertilizer, and other farm production inputs. 
12 See below. 
13 As an example: When detrimental weather conditions reduce the quality and/or quantity 
of the tomato harvest, not only the tomato farmer is hit in his or her sales income. Also 
the local factory, which is canning tomatoes, is likely to suffer in terms of sales and in-
come since its input is scarcer and possibly more expensive than usual. 
14 See for instance Meyer (2010) or Christen and Pearce (2005). 
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3.1 Investors’ Channels to Finance Agriculture 
From the investor perspective, there are three ways of financing agricultural ac-
tivities.15 Firstly, direct financing of agricultural producers, for example via agri-
cultural investment funds that target farms directly.16 Secondly and most obvious, 
indirect financing through rural financial institutions, and, thirdly, using non-
financial intermediaries such as traders or processors as financiers. The involve-
ment of processors or wholesalers in the process of providing finance is particu-
larly common in approaches described as “value chain finance”.17 
3.2 Agricultural Value Chain Finance 
Value chain and value chain finance have a range of meanings and connotations, 
and seem to be an evolving terms. Value chain in agriculture can be defined as a set 
of actors who conduct a linked sequence of value-adding activities starting from the 
agricultural producer or produce to processing and to the final consumer or product. 
Agricultural value chain finance comprises the financial flows to these different 
actors from within the chain (internal finance) and from outside institutions (out-
side finance) as a result of their being a member of the value chain.18 The impor-
tance of value chains in agriculture and its financing mechanisms has grown in 
many developing and transition countries as a result of globalization and the inte-
gration of local and regional markets into global agri-business value chains. 
For the small farmer, value chain finance offers a mechanism to obtain financ-
ing that may otherwise not be available due to a lack of traditional collateral and 
high transaction cost of securing a loan.19 This can be achieved either through 
members of the value chain, such as suppliers and traders, who are less confronted 
                                                          
15 Please note that we focus on formal financial services. Provision of capital by family or 
money lenders is widely used in rural economies in developing countries, but is not dis-
cussed here. Also, internal and self-financing – the financing by the cash-generating ca-
pacity of the enterprise or by the entrepreneur him-/herself – are not discussed. 
16 Typically this requires financing volumes of significant size, i.e. investments of small-
holders will not be financed directly by outside investors. An example for this approach 
is the African Agriculture Fund. The minimum investment by the AAF is USD five 
million. See http://www.phatisa.com/The_Fund_Manager/AAF/. 
17 For value chain finance see the chapter by Swinnen and Maertens (2013) in this volume 
and in the following chapter of this article. 
18 Compare Miller and Jones (2010), p. 9. Although rarely made explicit in the analysis 
and discussions of value chain development and value chain finance, authors typically 
refer to organized value chains, i.e. such value chains that are characterized by a spe-
cific and defined governance structure, typically arranged and structured via a set of 
longer-term contracts in order to facilitate the exchange process in the market. Such 
structure for the exchange of goods along a value chain is somehow the middle alterna-
tive in the span between a goods exchange in pure spot markets on the one end, and a 
vertically integrated firm on the other. 
19 Though empirical evidence on how much small farmers have benefited from agricul-
tural value chains is mixed. See Swinnen and Maertens (2012), in this volume. 
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with information asymmetries and transaction cost compared to financial institu-
tions (internal finance). Or it can be achieved by outsiders like banks that substi-
tute traditional collateral and screening techniques for the strength and reputation 
of the strongest partners in the value chain and for predictable cash-flows due to 
secure markets in organised value chains. Therefore, agricultural value chain fi-
nance offers the principal opportunity to reduce cost and risk in agricultural fi-
nance, thus increasing access of small farmers to credit.20 
There are different classifications of value chain finance mechanisms in agri-
culture ranging from very old and traditional instruments like trader and supplier 
credit to more complex products such as factoring or warehouse receipt finance. 
Some authors see a close relation between agricultural value chain finance and 
SF,21 and indeed some mechanisms used in agricultural value chain finance apply 
elements of SF according to our definition above: “The main purpose [of agricul-
tural value chain finance] is sharing risks among various actors, transferring de-
fined risks to those parties that are best equipped to manage them, and as far as 
possible, reducing costs through direct linkages and payments.”22 Additionally, 
warehouse receipts – collateral substitutes used in warehouse receipt finance 
schemes – can be pooled and securitized in future-flow securitizations.23 
We will describe and assess some of these instruments with elements of SF in 
the next section. 
4 Agricultural Risks and Risk Management Strategies 
Financial institutions are typically reluctant to finance agricultural activities, espe-
cially small and medium-sized farmers because of their perceived high costs24 and 
risks.25 In order to discuss whether risks issues of agricultural finance can be tack-
                                                          
20 However, successful agricultural value chain finance needs some minimum enabling 
environment, e.g. quality standards, effective contract enforcement to avoid the com-
mon problem of side selling and other forms of contract breaking as well as regulatory 
and legal provisions in the banking sector to allow traditional collateral substitutes. 
These framework conditions are not always in place. 
21 For example, Winn, et al. (2009) and Miller and Jones (2010). 
22 Miller and Jones (2010), p. 15. 
23 See Ananth and Sahasranaman (2011), p. 114. 
24 Some case studies suggest that a distribution reaching out to rural credit customers is not 
necessarily more costly than in urban areas. See Jainzik and Pospielovsky (2013) in this 
volume. 
25 Actually Meyer (2011) has not found any empirical evidence in the literature which can 
prove that lending to the agricultural segments is indeed more risky than lending to 
other sectors. From the authors’ experience, it is often misleading to state that banks as-
sess risk of farming businesses and lending to agriculture as high risk. Unfortunately, 
many banks and other financial institutions have no clear understanding about farm 
economics and markets for agricultural produce and they are lacking appropriate ap-
proaches to analyze the related risks so that there is actually no base for a professional 
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led with help of SF, we will take a look at risks involved in agricultural finance, as 
well as at the common approaches of financial institutions to handle these risks. 
4.1 Classification of Agricultural Risks 
Maurer (2013)26 classifies risks in agricultural lending into three categories: prin-
cipal credit risks, specific agricultural credit risks and political risks (Figure 3). 
Segmentation of Specific Agricultural Risks 
Level of risk Micro  Meso  Macro 
Affected groups Individual farm 
household  
Groups of households 
or communities 









Very frequent  Less frequent Low frequency 
Magnitude of 
losses 
Small losses  Significant losses Very large losses 
Incidence and 
Examples 
Regular variation in 
production: 
x smaller weather 








x severe weather 
conditions, e.g. 
flood 
x pest infestation 
Highly systemic, shocks 
affecting a large region 
and leading to 





x epidemic diseases 
Risk Layer Risk retention Market solutions 
(Insurance) 
Market failure 





Risk reduction and 
coping 
Risk pooling 




Fig. 3. Segmentation of specific agricultural risks. Source: Maurer (2013) 
                                                          
credit risk assessment by the banks. Thus, the reference to high risks in agriculture by 
banks is often only uninformed perception based on prejudices. 
26 Maurer (2013) in this volume; see also OECD (2009). 
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The principal credit risks of agricultural lending (or “normal credit risks”) are 
quite similar to those of micro and small enterprises, and are related to the high 
degree of informality of the potential borrowers and the lack of traditional loan 
collateral. These result in severe information asymmetries (particularly regarding 
the capacity and the willingness of the borrower to repay loans) and, thus, high 
screening and monitoring cost for the lender typically combined with relatively 
small loan sizes due to world-wide predominance of smallholder agriculture. 
Specific agricultural credit risks comprise production and price risks. Produc-
tion risks in agriculture stem from the high variability of production output as a 
result of external factors like weather (temperature, floods, drought, etc.), pests 
and diseases. Market price risks are more pronounced in agriculture than in other 
economic activities due to output price uncertainty and volatility in local as well 
as international markets. Both risk categories exist at different levels and scale, 
and are often correlated (see Figure 3). Such covariant risks are more difficult to 
manage since a diversification of these risks does not help to mitigate them – as it 
is the case with non-covariant risks. That is why they may hit a significant number 
of loans of a given loan portfolio at the same time. Hence these portfolios need 
special agricultural risk management strategies. 
Additionally, the agricultural sector in developing countries is more prone to 
political risk in the form of political interference than other sectors of the econ-
omy because of its strategic importance for food security, employment, and pov-
erty reduction. Politically motivated interventions in the form of sudden imposi-
tions of interest rate ceilings and the implementation or only the announcing debt 
relief are still common and constitute a major risk for agricultural lending institu-
tions.27 Since frequency of occurrence and severity of that type of risk cannot be 
assessed and predicted, it cannot be transferred and can hardly be managed.28 In 
many countries, it may qualify as the type of risk which is considered so high that 
it prohibits financial institutions from lending to farmers. 
                                                          
27 Existing interest rate caps as such (in contrast to their introduction) are not a risk for 
agricultural lending – interest rate ceilings are “only” preventing lending to small-
holders – since costs for doing this lending business cannot be recovered by the banks. 
As a consequence of interest rate caps, banks steer their credit activities towards me-
dium-sized and large farms. This credit-rationing necessity due to the cap has been 
found and proven in many studies. Agricultural economist Gonzalez-Vega (1984) has 
termed it “the Iron Law of Interest-Rate Restrictions”. While interest rate interventions 
might be well-intentioned and socially motivated or rational from the political point of 
view, in fact they always lead to negative effects with regard to sustainable financing in 
the agricultural and rural sector. For a synopsis of the effects of government interven-
tions in agriculture lending see Conning and Udry (2007), pp. 2864 et sqq. 
28 See Maurer (2013) in this volume. 
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4.2 Risk Management Strategies and the Role of Structured Finance 
Approaches to manage the principal credit risk in agricultural lending can 
benefit from the experience of microfinance in coping with the challenges of 
asymmetric information in credit analysis, of client monitoring, and of ensuring 
good repayment morale. However, two common characteristics of microfinance 
credit offers may limit service provision in agricultural lending. First, there are 
the relatively high administrative costs due to assessment and monitoring of cli-
ents (i.e. smallholders), which as a consequence require a corresponding level of 
interest rates for enabling the bank to maintain the business. The second critical 
feature is the extension of predominantly shorter-term standardized loan prod-
ucts with regular weekly or monthly equal repayments, which is quite common 
in microfinance. Both features are adequate and useful for trading and service 
sector activities but might be difficult to be shouldered by certain agricultural 
producers.29 
Specific agricultural risks are difficult to manage and constitute the major 
constraint for financial institutions to lend to agriculture (apart from political risk). 
As shown in Figure 2, specific risks can be segmented according to level, degree 
of correlation, probability of occurrence, and the magnitude of losses. 
The independent risk at the farm level is best assumed by the farmer 
him/herself, applying measures as risk reduction or prevention, mitigation and 
coping with the “normal” risk, including measures like crop rotation or application 
of pesticides. In addition, small farmers reduce risks by income diversification 
(non-farm income).30 
In contrast to the independent risks, there is a group of co-variant risks that 
affect larger groups of farmers at the same time (as well as processors and other 
actors in the value chain dependent on the farmer). These co-variant risks may put 
                                                          
29 See Maurer (2013). The argument that microcredit is generally not suitable for agricul-
tural activities – because returns on investment are lower for agricultural investments 
than for investments in urban trading business – is quite common. See for instance 
Harper (2007), p. 91. Empirical studies, however, suggest that return on investment 
does differ with the different types of agricultural activity. This is not surprising since it 
can be generally expected for any economic sector that some investments return more 
than others, making some entrepreneurs more likely to receive credit financing than 
others. Return on investment in agriculture as well as non-farm investments of rural 
households can indeed be substantial. See the different sources named by Meyer 
(2011), pp. 20-23, and Harper (2007), pp. 87-90. How microfinance banks can be inno-
vative in order to apply less rigid repayment terms is for instance described in Jainzik 
and Pospielovsky (2013), in this volume. 
30 While the risk management at the “retention layer” is the responsibility of the individ-
ual farmer, in particular, risk reduction measures can be supported from outside, e.g. 
through technical advice or provision of irrigation water. Such support can reduce the 
credit risk of the lender. 
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a financial institution’s agricultural loan portfolio under pressure because of a 
synchronised failure of a larger number of credit clients. Examples for such co-
variant risks are droughts or veterinary diseases preventing sale of stock, like for 
instance foot and mouth disease. Thus, well-managed banks only assume such risk 
to a limited extent.31 Figure 3 recommends “risk pooling” (insurance) and “risk 
transfer” as risk management strategies in order to allow financial institutions to 
build up and manage agricultural portfolios. 
Catastrophic risks like natural disasters and extreme weather events, which 
occur not frequently but create huge and highly correlated damage and losses, are 
difficult to pool and transfer through market instruments. Thus they create the 
typical market failure case and call for government and donor action. 
Structured finance solutions for agriculture, offering risk transfer mechanisms 
to suitable risk-takers, thus need to be explored in their potential to provide ade-
quate risk transfer for co-variant agro-specific risks. Crop or index-based insur-
ances are very much en vogue in the current discussion, albeit most schemes are 
still in the pilot-testing stage and potential for up-scaling and sustainability is still 
quite unclear. In contrast, the potential of segmenting and transferring risk with 
the methods of structured finance appears to be a less prominent idea. 
In the following, we will present and evaluate potentially suitable SF products 
and give some practical examples in the following section. The examples will also 
show that in many cases different structured finance products and instruments can 
be combined to tackle risk and cost issues. 
5 Application of Structured Finance in 
Agricultural Lending 
Figure 4 shows some examples of practical arrangements applying the different 
products of SF. 
The examples indicate some preference of donors, DFIs, and IFIs for portfolio 
guarantees and structured funds. While this might paint a realistic picture of ac-
tivities in the field of development cooperation, we emphasize that the majority of 
SF products are used in commercial-value-chain financing arrangements. We es-
timate that these purely commercial, private sector-based activities are not as pre-
sent in literature as programmes supported by development agencies. 
While in many cases different SF products are combined in order to maximize 
their risk-mitigation potential, we discuss them first individually.  
                                                          
31 Christen and Pearce (2005), p. 14, note that successful agricultural lenders typically 
limit their exposure to the farming sector at between 10 and 25 percent. 
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SF products Selected examples of 
application 
Parties involved 




Guarantee Fund (SAGF); IFC – 
Financiera Compartamos 
(Mexico); 
USAID – Standard Chartered 
Bank / PRIDE (Tanzania); 
Union Progreso (Mexico); 
SAID / CAFERWA / Rwanda 
(coffee); van Oers (Senegal); 















AgroAfrica Programme DEG, Standard 
Chartered 
 
Structured Funds Rural Impulse Fund I and Rural 
Impulse Fund II 
BIO, FMO, EIB, IFC, 
KfW, Incofin and 
private investors 
 




Livestock in Colombia National Agriculture 
and Livestock 
Exchange; Trust as 
SPV 





could be identified 
Receivables-Backed 
Finance 
Cedula Produto Rural in Brazil Private sector  






Warehouse Receipts Program 
Advisory Services (Ethiopia) 
IFC 
Relevant for more 
developed countries 
and for storable export 
commodities 
Various projects in rubber and 




Many private-sector driven 
schemes, e.g. Konzum in 
Croatia  
DEG; private sector 
(rubber company; 









Options MSX Commodity Exchange in 
India 
Commercial projects 
Private sector Larger companies 
world wide 
Fig. 4. Examples of Applied Structured Finance products 
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5.1 Agricultural Portfolio Guarantees 
Agricultural portfolio guarantees are usually provided by DFIs and IFIs as vertical 
partial guarantees with the objective to transfer risks of agricultural lending from 
the originator of the loan to another party. The authors were not able to identify 
any program with a second loss guarantee, although this appears much more suit-
able (see below). 
The concept of portfolio guarantees assumes that the guarantee encourages fi-
nancial institutions to make financing available to agriculture by reducing a 
lender’s perceived level of risk for agricultural loans. The guarantee should lower 
the lender’s potential loss from defaults. In addition, assumed advantages of a 
portfolio loan guarantee are: 
x More favorable loan terms and conditions for the farmer; 
x Reduced collateral requirements; 
x Longer repayment period for the agricultural loan, which enables borrow-
ers to finance agricultural investments. 
Additionally, portfolio guarantees are regarded as an instrument to bring banks 
closer to agricultural lending so that they gain experience and recognize that agri-
cultural lending might not be as risky as perceived. Therefore, such schemes are 
typically designed as temporary arrangement, not as permanent structures. 
Portfolio guarantees in agricultural finance are a preferred instrument of 
USAID and are also used by DFIs, as well as IFIs like IFC and AfD. 
In principle, the portfolio guarantee reduces the risk of agricultural lenders, 
thus, potentially increases agricultural lending. The impact on the farmer is access 
to finance, while there is no direct impact on the farmer’s specific agricultural 
production, market and price risks. 
Box 1: USAID Agricultural Portfolio Guarantees 
USAID uses credit guarantees from the Development Credit Authority (DCA) 
to foster lending to the agricultural sector in developing countries. DCA offers 
four main guarantee products: Loan Portfolio Guarantee, Loan Guarantee, 
Bond Guarantee, or Portable Guarantee. While each of these mechanisms var-
ies in structure, all retain risk with the private sector, typically the originator of 
the credit. Only a maximum of 50 percent of the lender’s risk are guaranteed. 
DCA guarantees are primarily offered in local currency to avoid the issue of 
foreign exchange rate risk and to redirect local capital to investments in the ag-
ricultural sector. 
From 1999 until mid-2012, USAID/DCA has mobilized around USD 446 
million of credit (maximum cumulated disbursement). It was made available 
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by financial institutions for the agricultural sector. This was reached by extend-
ing 82 guarantees, 79 of them loan portfolio guarantees. These guarantees for 
agricultural activities accounts for around 26 percent of the total 315 guaran-
tees extended by DCA.32 
5.2 Are Agricultural Portfolio Guarantees an Appropriate Tool? 
Let us apply the three dimensions of assessment grid (see Figure 2) which we de-
veloped in the beginning of the article and discuss the handling of information 
asymmetries,33 incentives,34 and risk carrying capacity35 of loan portfolio guaran-
tee structures. 
While donors, DFIs, and IFIs definitely have the capability to carry the risks 
arising out of the guarantees, partial guarantee schemes carry a major weakness in 
the lack of segmentation between specific agricultural and principal credit risks. A 
(partial) portfolio guarantee is like firing pellets with a shotgun instead of using a 
precision-rifle: It does not filter out and target the risks specific for agricultural 
lending. Instead, it also covers the principal credit risk – a risk that a financial in-
stitution should be able to deal with on its own by applying microfinance best 
practice (i.e. by adequate underwriting and monitoring techniques). Structured like 
this, a portfolio guarantee may even set wrong incentives: It reduces the origina-
tors financial risk, which is primarily born out of principal credit risk, and as a 
consequence may contribute to lowering the lender’s efforts to overcome informa-
tion asymmetries by a thorough credit client analysis. Thus, standard partial guar-
antees do not appear first choice in order to stimulate agro-lending. 
Typically, guarantee schemes were meant to help to overcome entry hurdles for 
financial institutions entering a new market. It is assumed that financial institu-
tions will learn and understand that the newly targeted segment is not as risky as 
previously perceived. And, thus, the guarantee schemes would not be required fur-
thermore. This hope seems to be largely without grounding.36 
                                                          
32 Own calculations based on https://explore.data.gov/, dataset for “USAID Development 
Credit Authority Guarantee Data: Utilization and Claims USAID Development Credit 
Authority Guarantee Data: Utilization and Claims.” For a review of the USAID guaran-
tee schemes see Meyer (2011), pp. 42 et sqq. 
33 The party or investor is most suited for understanding and assessing a certain type of 
risk. 
34 The party or investor is most suitable for influencing the probability of occurrence of a 
certain risk or the severity of the event. 
35 The party or investor has the financial or organizational means to efficiently and effec-
tively carry a certain risk. 
36 See Meyer (2011), pp. 33 et sqq. for an overview. 
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Although an empirical assessment of the usefulness of guarantee schemes for 
agricultural lending is still lacking, it appears likely that guarantee schemes for 
agricultural finance will end up with the same shady results as guarantee facilities 
for lending to SMEs. Several studies in the 1990s analyzing these widely used 
schemes were cautious about advocating guarantees to stimulate lending or ex-
pecting significant impacts from credit guarantee projects. There was no consen-
sus that such schemes widened access to formal bank credits for SMEs, and there 
was little clear evidence of additionality, i.e. evidence that the guarantee-backed 
loans would not have been made without such backing.37 
Agricultural economist Richard L. Meyer has reviewed the extensive literature 
on guarantee funds: “The case for expecting major impacts from guarantee 
schemes continues to be unclear. […] It is possible that guarantees may provide an 
additional bit of comfort for financial institutions that are interested in testing the 
feasibility of lending to a new client group. It is unlikely, however, that a guaran-
tee alone will induce much additional lending by lenders who do not have such an 
interest.”38 We would add that traditional partial guarantee schemes do not even 
help lenders who have this interest: Banks that understand their credit business do 
not require risk coverage for the principal credit risk (unless for instance they 
reach portfolio limits and want to grow beyond this limit). They do not pay the fee 
for a guarantee when the expected costs for write-offs for the bad loans (expected 
loss) are likely to be lower than the price for the guarantee. 
Box 2: AGRA’s Innovative Financing Initiative 
Recent enthusiasm for agricultural loan guarantees and for its impacts was 
raised by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), despite the 
mixed results of guarantee programs of previous decades. As part of its Innova-
tive Financing Initiative it has reportedly extended several guarantees to sev-
eral benefitting financial institutions (see AGRA Website and Meyer, 2011, p. 
34). Since no concrete details are provided on the design of the guarantees 
schemes, their adequacy and success remain unclear. 
Based on these experiences, AGRA had planned to set up a multi-faceted 
investment fund designed for supporting agricultural development (see AGRA, 
2010) termed Impact Investing Fund for African Agriculture. Among the vari-
ous activities, AGRA planned this fund to provide first-loss arrangements for 
banks that want to lend to the smallholder agricultural sector (see AGRA, 
2010, p. 28). Such first-loss guarantees would be an entirely defect design for 
tackling the actual risk exposure created through agricultural lending: They are 
                                                          
37 See Meyer (2011), pp. 33-37. Meyer lists the several studies upon which he based his 
summary. 
38 Meyer (2011), p. 37. 
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primarily covering the principal credit risk that a financial institution can per-
fectly handle on its own. A first-loss barely addresses the specific agricultural 
credit risks, which a financial institution cannot influence and which is the 
main brain-racker for banks active in agro-lending. Handing over the first loss 
to a third party is, additionally, a perfect disincentive for the originator to learn 
and apply a rigid credit analysis of a farmer borrower, and for monitoring and 
recovering properly.  
5.3 How Innovative Agriculture-Specific Guarantees Could Look 
However, the authors belief that portfolio guarantees can make sense if they are 
designed appropriately to capture the agro-specific risks. What banks are in need 
of is a more intelligent design that enables them to reduce their exposure to such 
co-variant specific risk, which they cannot influence. Particularly financial institu-
tions that already have some significant agricultural exposure could greatly bene-
fit, since such risk transfer could enable them to increase their lending which they 
otherwise would limit due to risk management considerations. 
In the following we sketch how such an adapted guarantee scheme could look. 
Specific agricultural risks guarantee schemes need to alleviate banks from spe-
cific agricultural risks. Thus, they need to be tailored differently from usual partial 
guarantees. Traditional vertical guarantees cover all credit default risks from prin-
cipal (or normal) credit risk, over specific agricultural risk to political risks in a 
fuzzy manner without delivering a differentiation. In contrast to such design, for 
targeting agricultural risks a horizontal segmentation delivers a segmentation of 
risk that can filter out agro-specific risk with some accuracy. 
A horizontal segmentation or tranching of an agricultural loan portfolio can dif-
ferentiate the three main sorts of credit default risk in agricultural lending. Tech-
niques for pooling and tranching originated loans are known from securitization 
operations. For instance, credit defaults of 3 percent or 5 percent of a pool of loans 
(i.e. what could be considered “normal” default rate due to principal risks) are re-
tained and written-off by the loan-originating bank. This isolates the principal 
credit risks that can be avoided and reduced by competent financial institutions. 
Defaults beyond this threshold are then likely to be caused by co-variant risks spe-
cific to agriculture. They could then be (partially) guaranteed in order to release 
the financial institution from this risk category and transfer it to parties that are 
better equipped and are willing to assume such risk. A third tranche can be in-
cluded to cover defaults above another threshold like for instance 50 percent. Such 
losses are likely to be due to catastrophic events. The adequate risk carrier for 
such catastrophic risk is the state.39 However, for making horizontal guarantees 
work, this risk tranche may be retained by the originating bank again: Banks fac-
                                                          
39 See Maurer (2012). 
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ing such exposure may hope to receive some support from their governments, for 
political reasons, as the state as the only capable risk carrier may be likely to sup-
port the risk-taking banks. 
Isolating political risk is likely to be a precondition for making the second 
tranche (the agro-risk specific tranche) interesting for commercially calculating 
investors. In any case, the risk profile of such a second tranche needs to be care-
fully analysed in terms of its actual exposure to the different risks as well as the 
probability and severity of occurrence. Only after such analyses would one know 
how to design such scheme, which might be suitable for investing parties, and 
what a sustainable and commercially viable pricing would look like. 
Because of its potential to help manage agriculture-specific risks, it appears ad-
visable to investigate the viability of such structures. Tranching a portfolio as de-
scribed above may be more cost-effective than tackling agro-specific risks by crop 
or other agricultural insurance. 
Agro-specific risk: The layer of occasionally 
occurring covariant risk with high impact on 
portfolio quality
Principal credit risk: The basic layer of credit default due to frequently 
occurring non-agro-specific reasons (i.e. illness of borrower, fire, theft etc.) 
Political risk
and catastrophic events:  
The layer of infrequently  
occurring risk with highest impact on  
overall portfolio quality 
 
Fig. 5. Horizontal tranching of a portfolio in order to segment different risk types. 
5.4 (No) Securitization in Agricultural Finance 
Securitization is an operation through that homogenous illiquid financial assets are 
pooled and transformed into marketable securities.40 In a securitization transac-
tion, the securitized assets are transferred by the originator (typically a loan-
extending financial institution) to a “bankruptcy remote” special purpose vehicle 
                                                          
40 See for example Basu (2005), Hüttenrauch and Schneider (2008) or Fender and Mitchell 
(2009). 
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(SPV) as the asset purchaser.41 This operation separates the credit risks of the as-
sets from the corporate risk of the originator. The latter is typically the main con-
cern of refinancing parties, i.e. other national or international banks that lend to a 
financial institution in order to enable it to build up or maintain credit portfolio. A 
further effect of a securitization can be the removal of the assets from the balance 
sheet of the financial institution. Such an operation in turn provides them with 
fresh money for new loans for the benefit of its clients. This may enable a finan-
cial institution to maintain a certain level of loan portfolio (for instance to the ag-
ricultural sector) without maximizing its exposure, or to maintain a solid capital 
adequacy for its credit operations. 
The pool of assets transferred to the SPV and the resulting cash flows of this 
pool are arranged and structured in a way that allows the SPV the issuance of se-
curities with different risk levels to investors in order to refinance the purchase of 
the pool from the originator. 
Typically, a first-loss tranche (also called “junior tranche”) takes the highest 
risk, followed by the mezzanine-tranche and the senior-tranche. The first-loss 
tranche and the mezzanine-tranche provide risk buffer for the senior tranche thus 
making the latter attractive for more risk-averse private investors. Payments fol-
low the subordination structure (“cascade principle” or “waterfall payment struc-
ture”). Consequently, the assets are structured with different levels of seniority re-
flecting and accommodating the different risk appetite of different investors. 
In agricultural finance, securitization could be an instrument that mitigates risks 
for private investors by creating a granular pool of loans to agricultural borrowers, 
separating the credit risk of the agricultural loan portfolio from the corporate 
risk of the local financial institution, restructuring and tranching the related 
cash flows and buffering portfolio risks by subordinated tranches. In princi-
ple, such securitization can lead to increased private financing for agriculture and 
improve refinancing of agricultural lending institutions by transferring most of the 
specific agricultural and principal credit risk from the financial institution to dif-
ferent type of investors (donors, DFI, private investors). Similar to traditional ag-
ricultural portfolio guarantees, there is no direct impact on the specific agricultural 
risks encountered by the farmer. 
So far, securitization has not been widely used in agriculture finance in develop-
ing and transition countries.42 The authors are not aware of any securitization of ag-
ricultural loan portfolios. We believe that the reason is the following: First, there is 
                                                          
41 Holding the assets in a bankruptcy remote vehicle aims at giving the investors a first 
ranking right to those assets. The SPV may be a corporation, trust or another type of in-
dependent legal entity. The SPV issues securities to the investors, which are backed by 
the income flows generated by the securitized assets and sometimes also by the under-
lying assets themselves (true sale). 
42 See Winn et al. (2009), p. 29, and Calvin and Jones (2010), p. 91. Calvin and Jones 
(2010), p. 91, report one livestock securitization in Colombia through the local agricul-
tural stock exchange (BNA) in the early 2000s. 
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hardly sufficient statistical data available on the default rates of agricultural loans of 
local financial institution active in agricultural finance. Second, due to the specific 
risk of agricultural lending – particularly the co-variant and political risks – there is 
little appetite of investors to separate just these assets from the lending institution 
and hence having, risk wise, a direct exposure to the end-borrower. 
Instead, investors prefer to benefit from diversification effects within the finan-
cial institution’s entire portfolio, which mitigates the particular risks of the agro-
loans. Additionally, the equity of the financial institutions may be regarded as a 
reasonable risk buffer, or to put it in other terms, when a financial institution has a 
significant agricultural exposure it may appear more advisable to take the corpo-
rate risk rather than the portfolio risk.43 Thus, we can see that investors who wish 
to invest in agriculture go for investments in rural financial institutions (debt or 
equity), rather than for investments in agricultural portfolios. 
5.5 Structured Funds Investing in Rural Finance 
Structured funds are investment vehicles, typically for refinancing financial in-
stitutions. Structured funds combine flexible fund management by private fund 
managers with elements of structured finance. They have the general objective 
to improve access of partner lending institutions to local and international capi-
tal markets.44 
Box 3: Africa Agriculture and Trade Investment Fund 
The Africa Agriculture and Trade Investment Fund (AATIF) is a public-
private partnership dedicated to increase Africa’s agricultural potential for the 
benefit of the poor. The fund started is operations in 2011. 
Its investment instruments include senior debt, mezzanine instruments, and 
equity. Debt instruments can have a maturity of up to ten years and only in ex-
ceptional cases up to 12 years (infrastructure investments); equity (available for 
direct investments) can be adapted to the various needs of investment phases. 
The fund can co-invest as part of a consortium and participate through risk 
sharing with a local bank or an intermediary. 
                                                          
43 This relates to the finding that diversification will remain one of the core approaches to 
mitigate risks in agricultural lending. See Maurer (2012). 
44 There is vast literature in particular on structured funds as MFI refinancing vehicle. See 
for example Glaubitt et al. (2008), Köhn and Jainzik (2005) or Goodman (2008). Well-
known structured funds are the European Fund for Southeast Europe (EFSE) and the 
Rural Impulse Fund II. Miller et al. (2010) provide analysis and some cases studies on 
agricultural investments funds, but without specifically emphasizing the reasoning be-
hind structured funds. 
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On its liability side, the fund is structured to allow investments at three dif-
ferent levels (A-, B- and C-shares), each offering a unique risk-return profile 
with dividends being paid following a cascade principle. It targets public inves-
tors (donor agencies, governments and international financial institutions) and 
professional private (institutional) investors 
AATIF is accompanied by donor-funded Technical Assistance Facility of 
initially six million euros. The facility will provide investment-specific support 
to partner institutions (e. g. in the fields of best-practices farming techniques, 
agricultural risk management, or support of certification processes). It will also 
promote compliance with the fund’s social and environmental safeguard guide-
lines and development policy, and shall facilitate impact assessments. 
In its first 1.5 years of operation, AATIF concluded two direct investments 
in agribusiness: USD 10 million have been invested in Chobe Agrivision Com-
pany, a Zambian farm operator with a strong focus on improving local and re-
gional food security with the production of wheat and soy in irrigation areas. A 
USD five million loan was negotiated with the Global Agri-Development Com-
pany (GADCO), a Ghanaian rice producer. Additionally, AATIF concluded two 
investments with financial institutions: PTA Bank received a USD 30 million 
facility. PTA is a multilateral financial institution, owned by eighteen East-
African member states, the People’s Republic of China, and the African Devel-
opment Bank. The funding will be used to expand PTA’s agricultural lending. 
Chase Bank (Kenya) Ltd, a privately owned Kenyan financial group, received 
funding under a five year senior loan facility of USD ten million. The loan is 
earmarked to support Chase Bank’s roll-out of its agribusiness sector strategy. 
In 2012, investors in the fund were the German government, KfW, and 
Deutsche Bank. The latter is also the investment manager of AATIF.45 
The main characteristic of structured funds is to pool and tranche diversified assets 
(mostly loans to financial institutions) into different classes. The asset side of struc-
tured funds may be quite homogeneous (for instance exclusively debt investments). 
The structuring takes place at the liability-side: Payments to the fund originated 
from its assets follow the subordination structure (“cascade principle” or “waterfall 
payment structure”). The capital is structured with different levels of seniority re-
flecting the different risk appetite of the different investors, typically corresponding 
to distinct risk-return profiles. Similar to securitizations, the junior or equity tranche 
are often invested in by the asset originator, i.e. the fund manager in this case (who 
can influence the risk through thorough screening and other measures), and by do-
nors or DFIs (that have the risk-bearing capacity and willingness).46 
                                                          
45 See www.aatif.lu. 
46 Compare Figure 2. 
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Structured funds offer a broad range of financial products and instruments that 
allow their structures to be demand driven and quickly adaptable to changing mar-
ket conditions. By applying structured finance elements they can attract private 
capital even for relatively risky countries or entities. This thus leverages limited 
donor funds and complements investments of DFIs and IFIs. Structured funds are 
established as legal entity and managed by professional private fund managers. 
They are governed by a board of directors or similar bodies according to the re-
spective legal domicile chosen by the investors in the fund. Like securitizations, 
structured funds can provide attractive conditions for private investments by risk 
mitigation through diversification at the regional, country, and financial institution 
level, as well as through adequate tranching. 
Thus, since diversification on the asset side is a core element of risk manage-
ment of structured funds, investments of these funds target rural finance and do 
not concentrate on agricultural finance. In other words, they try to avoid invest-
ments in financial institutions that are excessively prone to specific agricultural 
risks. Rather, they invest in rural financial institutions that have a diversified port-
folio themselves, i.e. in financial institutions that do not only invest in primary ag-
riculture and processing but also in other rural businesses that are not directly 
linked to farming and its specific risks. 
Box 4: Rural Impulse Fund I (RIF I) 
Rural Impulse Fund I (RIF I) was set-up in 2007 as a global, closed-end fund 
licensed as specialized investment fund under Luxemburg law. The fund has a 
planned lifetime of ten years and carries an investment volume of USD 38 mil-
lion. RIF I offers debt, equity, and guarantee investments for commercially viable 
rural MFIs with the objective to improve access of smallholders and rural micro 
and small enterprises to credit and other financial services. This strengthens the 
rural MFI’s financial structure and improves its rural outreach, impact, and sus-
tainability. 
The fund’s capital is structured with different levels of seniority reflecting 
the different risk appetites of the investors. The equity amounts to USD nine 
million, which is provided by DFIs and private investors at an equal share. The 
mezzanine tranche of USD ten million is provided by DFIs only. Senior debt of 
USD 19 million is provided by seven private institutional investors. 
The fund is managed by Incofin and investors are BIO, FMO, EIB, IFC, KCB 
Private Equity, Incofin and others, including private institutional investors. 
As of 12/2010 almost USD 31 million have been invested (mainly in debt) 
in 24 rural MFIs across 18 countries worldwide with a customer base of around 
1.5 million clients. About 50 percent of the MFIs have invested 25 percent or 
more of their portfolio to borrowers active in agriculture, while about 25 percent 
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of the participating MFIs lend more than 50 percent of their loan portfolio to 
the agricultural sector.47 
Because of RIF I’s economic and developmental success, a second fund 
RIF II was promoted by Incofin and launched in 2010. RIF II has a size of 
EUR 120 million and adopts a similar business model to the predecessor fund 
and includes both private and public investors.48  
6 Finance Structures in Value Chain Finance 
As highlighted above, a joint characteristic of approaches in Agricultural Value 
Chain Finance (apart from tackling the issue of distribution costs of financial ser-
vices) is that they intend to transfer defined risks to those parties in the chain that 
are best equipped to manage them. We will now e explore central approaches of 
value chain finance and discuss their designs from this risk-transfer perspective. 
6.1 Receivables-Backed Finance 
Receivable financing,49 typically discussed as one approach in Agricultural Value 
Chain Finance, is a method to convert produce sales on credit terms into immedi-
ate cash flows thus providing the farmer with flexible working capital. The credit 
is determined by the financial strengths of the buyer of the agricultural produce 
and not the farmer or seller of the receivables. For the financial institution the ad-
dress risk (in terms of moral hazard) is shifted from the farmer to the buyer.50 
Although often tailor-made, the financing is in principle structured as follows: 
The lending bank advances funds to a farmer for working capital (sometimes also 
investment finance). As security, the bank is given an assignment of future receiv-
ables from the designated buyer of the agricultural produce. This assignment is 
acknowledged by the buyer who will make payments according to the schedule in 
his delivery contract with the producer. All payments will go to the bank (collec-
tion and debt service accounts) in line with the repayment obligations of the 
farmer. Any payments for the farmer beyond his debt service to the bank will be 
remitted back to the producer. 
Receivables-backed financing is applied in agriculture using for example the 
contractual obligations between producer and buyer as a substitute for the bank’s 
                                                          
47 See www.incofin.be/static/en/what_we_do/for_investors/rural_impulse.aspx. 
48 See www.incofin.be/static/en/what_we_do/for_investors/rural-impulse-2.aspx. 
49 Receivables-backed finance includes instruments such as trade receivable finance, sup-
plier finance, factoring and forfaiting. See Winn et al. (2009), p. 7, and Miller and Jones 
(2010), p. 56. 
50 See Winn et al. (2009), p.18. 
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assessment of the creditworthiness of the farmer borrower. Risks are spread be-
tween the different parties with the buyer of the agricultural produce being 
the most important factor. The buyer screens the reliability of the borrower, 
whom he probably knows from earlier transactions, so that the information asym-
metry between buyer and farmer is smaller than between bank and farmer. 
Through the screening of the farmers, and support to them (for instance through 
agricultural extension), the buyer also has the opportunity and incentive to reduce 
the payment risk which he may have assumed towards the bank. The specific agri-
cultural risk typically remains with the farmer as the agricultural produce have to 
be sold by the farmer first. 
So far, receivables-backed SF is applied in agriculture mainly in international 
trade finance for export receivables (mainly to developed countries) because of the 
good credit standing of the buyer but to a much lesser extent in domestic finance.51 
A well-known example is the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) that since 1992 
signs international syndicated receivables-backed pre-export finance facilities. 
COCOBOD raises this short-term finance to support cocoa purchases from local 
growers during the crop season and sells them afterwards internationally.52 
Box 5: Receivables-Backed Finance 
Starbucks Coffee Company works with coffee-growers’ associations and is 
aware of the importance of pre-financing the farmers’ harvest and the local 
processing and preparation for export. To receive short-term loans from finan-
cial institutions the farmers associations can use their Starbucks sale contracts 
as reliable collateral. When the coffee is shipped, Starbucks pays the financial 
institution directly for interest and principal payments.53 
6.2 Warehouse Receipts Finance 
In warehouse receipt finance, a financier provides credit to a seller and relies on 
goods in an independently controlled warehouse to secure the credit. The ware-
house operator issues warehouse receipts, in one form or another (depending on a 
                                                          
51 See examples of the different forms of receivables-backed finance in Miller and Jones 
(2010), pp. 67 et seqq. and Winn et al. (2009), pp. 17 et seqq. Winn reports a successful 
programme in Brazil using domestic agricultural receivables in the form of Rural Prod-
uct Notes and combined with warehouse-receipt finance. 
52 For the 2011/2012 season, COCOBOD has raised 2 billion USD via this facility which 
was oversubscribed by over 20 international and Ghanaian banks. KfW Ipex Bank was 
among the investors. See www.ghana.gov.gh: “Ghana Cocoa Board Signs USD 2 Bil-
lion for 2011/2012 Cocoa Purchase.” 
53 See Miller and Jones (2010), p. 65. 
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country’s legal and regulatory system), which then form the basis of financing 
since these receipts function as artificially created collateral. Rather than relying 
on the producers’ (or exporters’) promise that the goods exist and that the pro-
ceeds of their sale will be used to reimburse the credit provider, the goods are put 
under the control of an independent warehouse operator. However, the credit pro-
vider still needs to ensure himself that the goods have not been pledged previ-
ously. Proceeds of sales are then used for repayment of credits. Warehouse re-
ceipts are negotiable and facilitate the conversion of illiquid farm produce into 
cash since they allow the farmer to make use of previously non-existing bankable 
collateral. 
The use of warehouse receipts as collateral provides the additional advantage that 
the commodities are no longer in the possession of the borrower, and hence if the 
borrower defaults the lender has easy recourse to the commodities. Banks or trading 
companies normally accept advancing funds against commodities that are being 
stored in reliable warehouses and have been assigned to the bank or trading com-
pany through warehouse receipts. For the financial institution the credit risk is 
not in the farmer anymore but instead in the successful sale of the stored agri-
cultural produce. Consequently, the financier assumes some specific agricultural 
risks since the value of the collateral depends on the current market prices. 
In principle, warehouse receipts are a strong form of security that can be com-
bined with other structured finance instruments. It can be used for durable goods 
that can be stored and must be standardized by type, grade, and quality, e.g. cotton 
or grains. However, its use is restricted to post-harvest financing and cannot solve 
the working capital problems of small farmers. 
While simple in concept, a warehouse-receipt system requires in practice the 
availability of safe warehouses and widely accepted commodity grades and stan-
dards. It needs a well-functioning and transparent warehouse management system 
and is largely limited to non-perishable goods with relatively predictable price de-
velopments (or forward markets). In addition, the system depends on additional 
legal and regulatory pre-conditions, e.g. the (regulatory) recognition of the receipt 
as legal document to be used as credit collateral and on fairly developed commod-
ity markets to ensure the tradability and liquidity of the receipts. Due to these re-
quirements and pre-conditions, the warehouse-receipt instrument is feasible in ag-
ricultural finance only in more advanced developing and transition countries.54 
In addition, there is a lack of detailed and careful empirical assessments to con-
clude whether the receipt system has improved access to finance, in particular for 
small farmers. The fact that warehousing is common for export crops suggests that 
economic barriers may constrain expansion into grains and other commodities 
produced primarily for local markets.55 
                                                          
54 Calvin and Jones (2010) and Miller et al. (2009) quote examples from India, the Philip-
pines and Brazil. 
55 Meyer (2011b), p. 44. 
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In terms of suitable risk transfer, this form of structure does not allow for a 
transfer of all specific agricultural risks: Production risk remains with the farmer. 
The price risk becomes partly transferred to the financier since the value of the 
collateralised agricultural goods is subject to price risk. Maybe the up-to-now lim-
ited success of warehouse receipt finance also relates to unwillingness by the 
banks to take collateral with usually volatile values. 
6.3 Forward Contracts, Futures and Options 
A forward contract is a non-standardized contract between two parties to buy or 
sell an agricultural product at a specified future date at a price agreed today.56 
Forward contracts can be tailor-made to fit specific requirements of the underlying 
agricultural commodity, and they are often embedded in different forms of value 
chain finance (see above). As they are privately negotiated and not exchange-
traded, they do not depend on well-established commodity exchanges. From the 
farmer’s perspective, forward contracts have the advantage of protecting against 
price drops. This establishes a floor in the expected revenue (successful produc-
tion given), which can facilitate access to finance. 
Futures are agreements with highly standardized and closely specified contract 
terms obliging the involved parties to buy or sell a certain quantity of agricultural 
produce at a fixed price at a future date. They are traded on future exchange markets. 
Options are risk management instruments that do not lock in prices but give 
protection against unfavorable price movements with the possibility of profiting 
from favorable ones. They trade on exchanges as well as on the over-the-counter 
market offered by banks or traders. They are hedging instruments and do not in-
volve the trade and exchange of agricultural products. Both futures and options are 
not used that often used for the benefit smallholder agricultural finance. Typically, 
volumes are too low here and product qualities vary too much. However, a pool-
ing of producers, for instance via farmer cooperatives, or in organised value 
chains, is in principle a way to make options available for smallholders and to 
overcome the issue of small ticket sizes. But such arrangements would need to be 
set up and developed by the supply side (i.e. exchanges, traders) and brought to 
the market by them since small-scale farmers in developing would rather not 
group together for the purposes of acquiring options. 
Overall, forward contracts, futures, and options provide the farmer hedging 
against price volatilities but have no impact on the agricultural production risk. 
                                                          
56 See Miller and Jones (2010), p. 85 and Winn (2009), p. 61. Miller and Jones (2010), pp. 
86-87 report a successful programme in Brazil using forward contracting in the form of 
“rural financial notes” (cedula produto rural). 
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6.4 Contract Farming 
Contract farming is not a SF product as such, but in contract farming often differ-
ent SF elements are used in order to address agricultural and non-agricultural 
risks. Contract farming is usually defined as an outsourced production contract 
(supply contract), e.g. between a pool or a group of agricultural producers and a 
central processing facility, wholesaler or international retailer. The arrangement, 
also called outgrower scheme, often involves the advancement of inputs, funds 
and technical assistance from the off-taker and an obligation to deliver and take a 
specific quantity of agricultural produce at harvest time, at a specific price (prod-
uct buy-back clause).57 The financing of working or investment capital (often 
needed to allow the farmers for producing the required quantities and qualities) is 
provided by the agribusiness firm, the wholesaler/international retailer or by a fi-
nancial institution. In many cases contract farming involves a lead firm that pro-
vides farmers with inputs, finance, technical assistance, and market access, and 
ensures quality and timely product delivery.58 
Contract farming reduces the agricultural production risk for the farmer through 
technical assistance as well as secured and adequate input provision. This follows 
more a risk-prevention, rather than a risk-transfer approach. The forward con-
tracting, which is often involved in such schemes, also reduces the marketing and 
price risks, both for producers and buyers. For the agricultural lender it may shift 
the credit risk from the farmer to the buyer of the produce, when guaranteed sales 
agreements can be used as collateral. 
A major problem in contract farming for the agribusiness firm is side-selling: In 
case of increased prices for the produce, the farmers may sell to other buyers. In-
versely from the perspective of the farmer, purchase commitments may be broken 
by agribusinesses when market prices are decreasing with the formerly agreed 
price in the scheme resulting much higher than current prices at the time of har-
vest. Thus, the address risk (in terms of moral hazard) to be taken into account by 
a financing institution is influenced by the contractual structure. In general, in fi-
nancing contract farming structures the address risk is transferred from the farmer 
towards the off-taker. Thus, the risk the financiers have in their books moves from 
a diversified portfolio of smallholder farmers as credit clients to one or a low 
number of bigger corporate clients. From a risk perspective, a highly granular 
portfolio of comparatively (potentially) high individual default risk is exchanged 
with a big risk concentration with (potentially) lower default probability. Thus, it 
is not clear if this risk transfer will actually result positive or negative. 
                                                          
57 See UNCTAD (2002), p. 10, and Winn et al. (2009), p. 7. 
58 The Starbucks example also applies the lead firm approach. 
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7 Summary 
Figure 6 summarizes the analysis of the different SF products and shows which of 
the various agricultural lending risks are mitigated by the respective SF products. 
The figure also explains why in practice, especially in agricultural value chain fi-
nance arrangements, very often different SF products are combined in order to in-
crease risk mitigation effects. 
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Fig. 6. Transfer and mitigation of agricultural lending risks (simplified) 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
There are no simple solutions for creating sustainable agricultural credit systems, 
and SF is certainly an instrument with potentials but also limitations. We find a 
quantitatively relevant application of SF instruments in agriculture so far concen-
trated on value chain finance approaches. In particular, these approaches show 
practical relevance when they include agro-processing and focus on high-value 
cash crops with already existing export markets and reliable export contracts. 
However, one can state that other SF approaches are also in principle suitable 
to foster agricultural lending, if applied appropriately and considering its specific 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of risk-transfer abilities. Effects at the small-
farmers level through improved access to credit at better terms, reduction of mar-
ket and price risk and lowered production risk may be reached. 
Direct reach of small farmers still remains a challenge because scale of opera-
tions remains important when applying SF approaches. The set-up of SF arrange-
ments (e.g. securitization) is costly, complex and time-consuming and involves 
inter alia valuation, quality assurance, security assessment, legal analyses, and a 
lot of related paper work. 
We assume that there are some factors that will contribute to an increased use 
of SF in agriculture: 
x Commercially oriented agricultural sectors with competitive advantages in 
high-value cash crops will continue to make use of risk-transfer possibili-
ties within organised value chains; 
x Fairly well-developed commodity exchanges and future markets – also in 
developing economies – will allow for increased use of such instruments 
and for inclusion of such instruments in SF approaches, particularly value-
chain related ones; 
x The current increase of agricultural finance by at least some professional 
private banks in developing countries will increase the demand for SF in-
struments, in order to allow such institutions to better manage their risk on 
a portfolio level by transferring some of the risks to third parties willing to 
carry it. 
However, important preconditions or bottlenecks for increased use of SF products 
remain. According to our understanding, these are particularly the following: 
x Adequate basic rural infrastructure, e.g. transportation, communication and 
storage facilities such as warehouses (for warehouse-receipt finance); 
x Standards and certification of agricultural products by type, size, and quality; 
x Legal and regulatory system that ensures the enforcement of contracts; 
x Banking regulations that recognize warehouse-receipts as legal documents. 
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Also, policy issues remain. Improving the framework conditions according to the 
bullet points above (most of them with public good character) is a task for gov-
ernments. But there are also some specific interventions that may be suitable to 
overcome bottlenecks for the initial use of SF approaches in order to pave the way 
for a broader use of these instruments, and for a use without continuous involve-
ment of the public sector. Both national governments and donors or other public 
investors may play an important role by: 
x Providing technical assistance to promote and upgrade banks and to cover 
the up-front costs of agricultural SF transactions; 
x Covering (temporarily maybe) the most risky part of agricultural SF trans-
actions.59 
Development finance institutions, both national and international ones, can be an 
important facilitator of adequate use of SF in agricultural finance. Such DFIs have 
detailed knowledge of the financial sectors in the respective developing and transi-
tion countries and its legal and regulatory environment on one hand, and they have 
a reputation in the commercial world on the other. They have different banking 
products in place, and they understand banking risks. From this position they can 
perform the following functions in agricultural SF transactions as a complement to 
government efforts: 
x they take an active role in structuring risks as the lead or structuring inves-
tor by becoming involved in agricultural SF transaction at its inception; and 
x because of their developmental orientation they can take higher risks com-
pared to commercial investors, taking the mezzanine tranches, while offer-
ing senior tranches to more risk-sensitive investors. 
Moreover, DFIs are well positioned to act as “honest brokers” with regulators to 
overcome legal and/or regulatory hurdles, permitting the introduction of agricultural 
SF products to a new market or asset class in developing and transition countries. 
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